Costs on a Summary Judgment Motion

In Mo v. Johnson, the defendant successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim.  Justice Morgan's decision on costs is reported at 2012 ONSC 6307 (CanLii). 

One of the arguments made by the plaintiff was that the defendant was only entitled to costs of the motion, not the entire action.  Justice Morgan disagreed, holding that:

[24]      I agree with Mr. Bizezinski that where summary judgment dismisses the action, it is the costs of the action in its entirety that are at issue. To hold otherwise would allow a party who brings spurious litigation to cause the opposing side to incur substantial costs with no means of compensation. 

The defendant was awarded costs of the entire action on a substantial indemnity basis due to the plaintiff's conduct, which was described as "aggressive and high-handed".  The decision is a nice synopsis of some of the basic principles relating to costs. 

Cost of Productions

Who pays for the cost of producing documents?

In Veillette v. Piazza Family Trust, 2012 ONSC 4782 (S.C.J.), the plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant to answer undertakings and refusals he gave on an examination in aid of execution.  The defendant took the position that the plaintiffs must pay any charges for obtaining the documents.

The Court cited two cases dealing with production of documents before trial, Ho v. O’Young-Lui, 2002 CanLII 6346 (ON SC), and Traverse v. Turnbull, [1996] N.S.J. No. 212 N.S.C.A. which held that the general rule is the party in possession or control of the documents is to produce them at their expense, although the court has residual discretion to depart from that rule where fairness and justice so require.  The general rule may be altered if its application would prevent a party from presenting its case.  Justice Kane held that there was no reason to depart from the general rule.

Although this case deals with an examination in aid of execution, disagreement over who pays for documents can often arise in the context of examination for discovery.  The Veillette case is useful in providing a succinct argument as to why plaintiffs should bear the cost of producing their documents.

Martin v. Fleming - Deductibles

The Court of Appeal has now released its decision in Martin v. Fleming, which can be found at the following link: Martin v. Fleming, 2012 ONCA 750 (C.A.)

At issue was the operation of the deductible where a plaintiff has been in multiple accidents.  The motions judge ruled that where the plaintiff has been involved in two accidents and the actions are tried together, there is a deductible for each action.

In a brief endorsement, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. They followed the motion judge's reasoning that s. 267.5(7) is unambiguous and the plaintiff is subject to two deductibles.

Although this is a brief endorsement, it is important to those defending claims where the plaintiff has been in multiple accidents.  Insurers for each defendant retain the benefit of the deductible.

Expert Independence

Do the new rules pertaining to expert evidence impose a higher duty than at common law?  When an expert is alleged to be biased due to a connection to one of the parties or a matter in issue, does it go to admissibility or weight? 

In Henderson v. Risi, 2012 ONSC 3459 (S.C.J.), the defendant proffered an expert, Mozessohn, to give testimony at trial regarding irregularities in the financial records of Timeless Inc., provide an opinion on the value of shares in Timeless held by the plaintiff, and critique the plaintiff expert's opinion.  The plaintiff objected to the admissibility of Mozessohn's evidence on the basis that he was not independent or impartial since he was a partner in the accounting firm that acted as Timeless' Trustee in Bankruptcy.  Mozessohn testified that there had been no communication between members of his firm about the case.

Justice Lederman quoted the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Gallant v. Brake-Patten 2012 NLCA 23 (CanLII), which summed up the law regarding the admissibility of expert evidence where the allegation is the expert lacks institutional independence as opposed to personal advocacy:

In summary, in civil cases, if expert evidence meets the Mohan criteria for admissibility, it is admissible.  Bias or partiality in expert evidence which is based on the expert having a connection with a party or issue or a possible pre-disposition or approach in the case is a reliability issue which is best determined when the whole of the expert evidence is considered in the context of all of the trial evidence.  As such, the issue is one of weight and not admissibility.

Plaintiff's counsel argued that the new r. 4.1 and the changes to r. 53 imposed a higher level on duty on an expert in Ontario, and that the question of institutional independence must be determined at the admissibility stage rather than leaving it to be considered as a matter of weight.

Justice Lederman disagreed and allowed the expert to give testimony.  Rules 4.1 and 53 simply remind experts of their already existing obligations to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan.  Any lack of institutional independence went to weight rather than admissibility.  The new rules impose no higher duties than already existed at common law.

Restricting Summary Judgment

Are courts beginning to restrict the use of summary judgment?

Justice Brown took the opportunity to comment on summary judgment in a decision encompassing two cases, George Weston Limited v. Domtar Inc and 1318214 Ontario Limited v. Sobeys Capital Inc., 2012 ONSC 5001 (S.C.J.).  These were two cases from the Commerical List in Toronto where counsel sought to schedule summary judgment motions.  In George Weston, the plaintiff sought to schedule a summary judgment motion prior to examinations for discovery.  In 1318214 Ontario, discoveries were mostly complete and when the plaintiff sought to set the matter down for trial, the defendant advised it intended to bring a motion for partial summary judgment to limit the issues for trial.

Justice Brown laments the motion culture in Toronto and what he sees as a reluctance of counsel, especially counsel who have practiced for less than 15 years, to bring cases to trial.  He suggests that instead of bringing summary judgment motions, counsel should take more cases to trial and that courts should facilitate the process by approving innovative ways of proceeding to trial; for example, evidence could be a hybrid of written and viva voce evidence.

It will be interesting to see if other judges share Justice Brown's concerns and if courts will start restricting the use of summary judgment motions.  Defence counsel and insurers will need to carefully assess each case to determine whether the appropriate way is to proceed by way of summary judgment or whether it might be more beneficial to simply proceed to trial. 

Second Independent Medical Examination - Evidence

What evidence is necessary on a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a second independent medical examination?

In Nasir v. Kochmanski, 2012 ONSC 4088 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff was a minor who was injured in a motor vehicle accident.  The claim alleged the plaintiff was struck while a pedestrian and sustained a head injury and various psychological impairments.  He had been assessed by a number of medical doctors and psychologists, both treating and arranged by plaintiff`s counsel.  He had been assessed by a paediatric neurologist on behalf of the defendant, although no report had been prepared.  The defendant sought to have the plaintiff assessed by a psychologist.  The proposed assessor wrote a letter to defence counsel outlining the assessment, its length, information she would require from the plaintiff`s parents, and test results from other assessments she required.

Justice Daley permitted the assessment.  The proposed assessment was outside the scope of expertise of the neurologist, according to the psychologist`s letter.  There was no evidence the assessment would delay trial or prejudice the plaintiff.  Since the plaintiff was very young, his evidence would be of limited evidentiary value, and the most probative and reliable evidence would have to come from experts.  Trial fairness favoured the second examination.

It should be noted that the evidence in support of the motion appears to come from a letter from the proposed assessor.  Justice Daley stated that it would have been preferable to have an affidavit or report from the neurologist outlining the need for a further examination, but accepted that there was enough evidence to support the motion.  There is some inconsistency in the case law as to the form of evidence needed on a motion for a further examination, and counsel should carefully consider whether it would be beneficial to have affidavit evidence. 

  

Catastrophic Impairment: Aviva v. Pastore

The Court of Appeal has released an important decision relating to catastrophic impairment:

Aviva Canada Inc. v. Pastore, 2012 ONCA 642 (C.A.)

The insured was injured in a 2002 motor vehicle accident as a pedestrian and sustained an ankle injury. She alleged her gait had been altered and was diagnosed with a pain disorder.  A DAC found her to be catastrophically impaired in 2005 due to a marked mental or behavioural impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the SABS.  An assessment under s. 2(1.1)(g) is carried out with reference to the AMA Guides, which provide for an assessment of function in four categories:

(1)              Activities of daily living (ADL);

(2)              Social functioning;

(3)              Concentration, persistence and pace; and

(4)              Deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings.

Pastore was diagnosed with a number of psychological disorders and the DAC concluded that she had a class 4 marked impairment in activities of daily living.  The DAC concluded she was catastrophically impaired on the basis of the one class 4 impairment.  The insurer did not agree with the assessment and the matter proceeded to mediation then arbitration.

At arbitration, the arbitrator agreed with the DAC assessors and held that one marked impairment was enough to comply with the Guides approach to impairment.  In addition, it was appropriate to consider physical pain in assessing mental disorder, as it was not possible to factor out all physically based pain since it was intertwined with mentally based pain. The Director's Delegate upheld the decision, but the Divisional Court overturned the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the arbitrator`s decision.  The conclusion that only one marked impairment is sufficient to meet the definition of catastrophic impairment was a reasonable one. In addition, it was not an error for the DAC assessors to consider both physical and mental pain.

Pastore appears to have lowered the bar for catastrophic impairment based on a mental disorder and more claimants may be able to fit themselves into a catastrophic designation than prior to this decision.