Damages for Intentional Tort Survive Bankruptcy

The Court of Appeal recently released a decision that looks at the interplay of tort law and bankruptcy.

In Dickerson v. 1610396 Ont. Inc. (c.o.b. Casey's Pub & Grill), 2013 ONCA 4955 (C.A.), a jury awarded the plaintiff damages against the defendant in excess of $1 million arising out of an assault.  The defendant punched the plaintiff once in the head, causing the plaintiff to lose consciousness, fall to the ground and sustain brain damage.  As a result of the judgment, the defendant declared bankruptcy.  The plaintiff brought a motion for an order that the award of damages survived bankruptcy, based on s. 178(1)(a.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which provides:

178(1) An order of discharge does not release the bankrupt from 

 (a.1) any award of damages by a court in civil proceedings in respect of 

(i) bodily harm intentionally inflicted, or sexual assault or 

(ii) wrongful death resulting therefrom.

The motions judge held that although the jury found the defendant "deliberately punched the plaintiff in the head", the verdict did not provide a framework to assess whether it was an "intentional infliction of bodily harm". She dismissed the motion and the plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(a.1) will apply where there is direct proof of intentional infliction of bodily harm or where it can be reasonably inferred.  As long as there is intent, the section will apply; there is no requirement to show the circumstances were sufficiently offensive to social mores to justify withholding the protection of bankruptcy.

Municipality Not Liable in Recreational Trail Case

Recently the Ontario Courts found a municipality not liable, under section 4(1) of the Occupier’s Liability Act, for the plaintiff’s fall off the edge of a ravine. In coming to this finding the court took an expansive view of when this section applied and indicated what is required to meet the lower standard of care under this section.

In Pierce v. Hamilton(City), 2013 ONSC 6485 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff entered the park on a marked recreational trail near the edge of the Niagara Escarpment, he then left the trail and proceeded on an unmarked dirt path and fell off the edge of the ravine sustaining physical injuries. The City of Hamilton acknowledged that they were the occupier of the premises, but asserted they had met the standard of care.  The trail itself qualified as a recreational trail and was clearly marked as such, but the issue was whether the dirt path also qualified.  The Court held that the standard of care was the same as if the plaintiff was on a marked trail, stating:

“If that owner is given the benefit of the lower standard of care in return for allowing the public to enjoy the recreational trail on the land, it makes no sense to saddle the owner with the higher standard of care the moment a hiker or cyclist or skier moves off of the recreational trail. Further, it makes no sense for two different standards of care to alternately apply as a trail user hops on and off of the recreational trail.”

Given this, the plaintiff was deemed to have willingly assumed all risks associated with the premises and the lesser standard set out in section 4(1) of the Occupier’s Liability Act applied.

The Court accepted the evidence of the representative of the City that they had not received any previous complaints of people falling into the ravine and thus had no information that would suggest there was an unusual danger on any dirt path in the park area.   Justice Henderson rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the City failed to meet the standard of care for failing to conduct inspections of the park, for failing to have warning signs and for failing to construct a protective fence.  Justice Henderson held that it would be impossible for the City to conduct regular inspections of the 3,000 acres of natural areas. Regarding the signage and fencing, the Court held:

“As to signage, clearly a specific warning sign was not warranted if the City was not aware of any specific danger... I find that the failure of the City to erect a more general warning sign, such as "Caution. Uneven Ground in the Woods" does not constitute a breach of its duty. Such a warning sign would in fact be a sign stating the obvious; that is, that the terrain in the woods is uneven and unpredictable... I also reject the plaintiffs' submissions that the City ought to have built a barricade or a fence near the drop-off into the ravine. The danger of a sharp drop in elevation in a wooded area that was near the edge of an escarpment should be obvious to anyone who entered the woods.”

This case builds on the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in the Schneider v. St. Clair Region Conservation Authority case regarding when section 4(1) applies and highlights the lower standard of care under this section.

Leave Required for Refusals Motion After Set Down – Part II

We previously posted on the decision of Jetport v. Jones Brown, 2013 ONSC 2470 (S.C.J.), which held that leave is required for a refusals motion that is commenced after the action has been set down.  The Jetport decision has been followed in Hamilton v. Ontario(Minister of Transport), 2013 ONSC 4536 (S.C.J.).

In Hamilton, a representative of the defendant was examined for discovery on March 30, 2012.  In response to a status notice, the plaintiffs delivered a trial record and set the matter down for trial on January 22, 2013.  The plaintiff then brought a motion seeking answers to refusals on March 7, 2013.  The motion was dismissed by Master Haberman on the basis that the plaintiff had not sought leave for as required by rule 48.04 and the plaintiff appealed.

On appeal Firestone J. held that although there was disagreement in the case law on the issue of whether leave is required, Master Haberman was not in error when she chose the line of authority that appeared most persuasive.  The line of authority followed by Master Haberman and approved of on appeal was that of Jetport v. Jones Brown.     

Because leave was not sought, the Master was correct in not considering the issue of refusals. 

It may have been that the Master’s decision was meant to be a procedural slap on the wrist to the plaintiff.  The decision notes that the requirement for leave was neither sought nor addressed by the plaintiff in their original motion material.  The Master’s decision did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a motion for leave to have their refusals motion heard.  Counsel should be cautious about setting a matter down if they wish to pursue refusals.  They should also seek leave of the court, and address this in motion materials when in doubt.  

Limitation Periods in Insurance Contracts

Can a one year limitation period in an insurance contract override the two year limitation period?

 The Ontario Court of Appeal says it can. In Boyce v.The Co-Operators General Insurance Company, 2013 ONCA 298, the Boyces owned and operated a boutique insured by the Co-Operators. A foul odour was discovered on October 30, 2010 and the Co-Operators took an off coverage position on the basis the smell was caused by a skunk.

The Boyces claimed that the business had been vandalized, a peril covered by the policy, and they filed a proof of loss claim in December 2010 and commenced an action in February 2012, more than one year, but less than two years after the incident. The Co-Operators moved for summary judgment, claiming that the action was time barred by a one year limitation period set out in the insurance contract.

The motion judge held that the one year limitation period in the contract did not override the statutory two year limitation period set out in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002. The Co-Operators appealed.

A term in a contract purporting to vary an otherwise applicable limitation period under the Limitations Act has to comply with s. 22 of the Limitations Act. That section allows parties to vary or exclude, by agreement, the otherwise applicable statutory limitation period. The Co-Operators relied on s. 22(5) which applies only to business agreements.

The Court of Appeal stated at paragraph 20:

A court faced with a contractual term that purports to shorten a statutory limitation period must consider whether that provision in ‘clear language’ describes a limitation period, identifies the scope of the application of that limitation period, and excludes the operation of other limitation periods. A term in a contract which meets those requirements will be sufficient for s. 22 purposes, assuming, of course, it meets any of the other requirements specifically identified in s. 22.

In order for s. 22(5) to apply the contract must be a “business agreement” defined by the Limitations Act as “an agreement made by parties none of whom is a consumer”. The Court of Appeal found that the Boyces contracted with the Co-Operatos for insurance covering various risks related to the operations of their business and the contract was not for personal, family or household purposes. As such the contract was a “business agreement”. The appeal was allowed. 

Surveillance particulars must be served even if not relying on it at trial

A recent decision has held that a defendant who obtains surveillance must serve particulars of it, even if not relying on it at trial.

In Arsenault-Armstrong v. Burke, 2013 ONSC 4353 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff sought an undertaking that the defendant provide particulars of future surveillance, including date, time, name of investigator and so forth.  The defendant refused to provide particulars if she was not relying on the surveillance at trial.

Justice Hambly held that the defendant must provide particulars of surveillance even if she does not intend to rely on it at trial.  At paragraph 11, Justice Hambly stated:

[11]           The consequences of the defence not producing the full particulars of surveillance evidence in its possession, even if in the period leading up to the trial the defence is of the view that it will not rely on it at trial are well illustrated in Beland.  The surveillance evidence will assist the plaintiff in evaluating the strength of her case and arriving at her settlement position prior to trial.  Even if the defendant will not be able to use the surveillance evidence for impeachment purposes, as a result of its non-disclosure, the defence will gain knowledge of the plaintiff from the surveillance evidence which it will be able to use to its benefit.  A requirement that the defence produce it even if it does not presently intend to use at trial is consistent with what the Court of Appeal said in Ceci v. Bank (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 381 quoted above by Justice Howden.  In Beland, after a 17 day trial a jury dismissed the plaintiff’s case.  The trial judge fixed costs against the plaintiff, exclusive of HST at $115,318. This is a devastating result for a plaintiff. Perhaps it could have all been avoided if the disputed surveillance evidence had been produced by the defendant.

The difficulty with this decision for the defence is that the value of surveillance as an impeachment tool may be lost if the plaintiff has knowledge of the particulars.  In addition, if the defence does not intend to rely on it at trial, how can it assist in settlement?  Lastly, the decision does not give guidance on how far in advance of trial the particulars must be disclosed.

Is the Insurer Always Justified in Denying Coverage On the Basis of a Breach of a Statutory Clause?

Every automobile insurance policy issued in Ontario contains statutory clause 4.1:

 

                The insured shall not drive or operate or permit any other person to drive or operate the automobile unless the insured or other person is authorized by law to drive or operate it.

 

Section 32 of Highway Traffic Act requires an operator of a motor vehicle to hold a valid driver’s licence. In Kozel v.Personal Insurance Co. [2013] ONSC 2670 (S.C.J), the applicant was a 77 woman year old woman who was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Florida. Her insurer denied coverage on the basis that she was in breach of the policy at the time of the accident because her driver’s license had expired. The applicant brought this application for a declaration that the insurer owed a duty to indemnify and defend her in a third party action against her.

 

Approximately five months prior to the accident, the applicant received documentation from the Ministry concerning the renewal of her driver’s licence and vehicle plate sticker. Two weeks prior to the renewal date, the applicant gave the package of documentation to her dealership where she took delivery of a new vehicle. She was unaware that this package contained her licence renewal. Until the accident occurred, she was unaware that her licence had not been renewed. She reported the accident in a timely manner and renewed her license immediately upon discovering it was expired.

 

Justice Wood cited the 2011 Court of Appeal decision Tut v. R.B.C. General Insurance Company [2011] ONCA 644 where it was held that if an offence for breaching the regulation was one of strict liability rather than absolute liability, it was open to the insured to argue that he took all reasonable care in the circumstances to see that he was not in breach of the regulation. Were he able to argue this defence successfully it would follow that he remained authorized to drive within the meaning of statutory condition 4(1).

 

Justice Wood held that since an offence of driving with an expired licence is one of strict liability, an argument that the applicant exercised due diligence was available. Justice Wood found that the applicant took active steps to ensure that she met her duty, although mistakenly, she provided a believable explanation for her lack of perfect diligence and her actions were those of a reasonable person acting upon a genuinely mistaken belief.  As such, the court found that the applicant was entitled to a defence under the policy.

 

This case shows that breaches of the insurance policy are not always clear cut and can involve the consideration by the court of many subjective factors.    

Can a Plaintiff Avoid Discovery Due to Medical Reasons?

Can a plaintiff avoid attending discovery or an independent medical examination due to anxiety or an inability to respond to questions appropriately?

In Lalousis v. Roberts, 2013 ONSC 5897 (S.C.J), the plaintiff sought $4 million in two actions relating to two motor vehicle accidents.  She alleged that she could not participate in oral discovery or an IME  due to medical reasons, including that she was not able to respond to questions, had poor communication and attention, and discovery would increase her anxiety and depression.  She sought to avoid the discovery process or have her husband act as a substitute.

Master Muir dismissed the motion.  A party has a prima facie right to a full and complete discovery of an adverse party, which includes oral examination and may include a medical examination.  The threshold to limit a party's right to discovery is a high one and should be ordered only in the rarest of cases.  In the circumstances, an examination for discovery might be unproductive as she may not provide responsive answer, and it could cause anxiety for the plaintiff; however, there was no evidence that it would cause her permanent damage.

In order to permit the defence to fully respond to the claim against it, it makes sense that the threshold for taking away those rights is very high.